The Consistency Of Physical Law With Divine Immanence
Physics Department, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, U.K.
Published in: Science & Christian Belief, 5 (1993) pp.19-36
A model is presented to show how the existence of physical law could be
a reasonable consequence of Divine Immanence in the world of natural phenomena.
Divine Immanence is seen as the continual production of the principal causes
or dispositions which enable created things to act and change. It is argued
that this model is physically consistent, philosophically coherent, and
Do things in the world proceed by themselves, or are they dependent for
their continued operation on something else? On one hand, beings in the
universe certainly seem to act and interact autonomously, and modern physics
has been increasingly successful in showing the self-sufficient and law-like
behaviour of natural objects. On the other hand, classical theism has included
the idea that God, as well as creating the world, also sustains the continued
existence of the created entities. This paper will discuss the question
of whether God may be said to sustain the world, and, if so, how this may
be accomplished in a manner consistent with physical observations.
Physicists have traditionally been suspicious of any intimate involvment
of God with the natural world, being for example
``deeply suspicious of how [this] could corrupt the process of scientific
enquiry. At what point in the investigation of the evolution of the human
eye, for example, will investigators feel free to chicken out, ascribing
some parts of the process to natural selection and others to God?'' They
might be more inclined to the weaker claim of a ``once and for all God,
one who drew up the laws of physics and then left us to it, in the Big
Bang perhaps'', as they are reluctant to allow a `God of the gaps' who
may have intervened from time to time and disrupted the natural order.
For they want to determine those causes of natural things from which effects
regularly proceed as described by physical laws. I will be attempting to
see if divine involvement can be consistent with these kinds of physical
In philosophy there have been similar preferences for a more abstract
or `metaphysical' account of the relation between Divinity and nature,
and a reluctance to talk of Divine immanence directly. Confining ourselves
to those philosophies of process that
seek to describe the real properties and activities of things in nature,
the closest these philosophies come to immanence is when they consider
God to be the `arche', Principle or Ground underlying all natural changes.
These philosophies often mention an immanent reason (not so much the immanent
power) that provides the necessary ground for contingent natural events.
But although they describe reasons essential to the processes themselves,
and not merely in the mind of someone looking from outside, a `ground'
or `arche' need not be immanent in the sense of being internal to the actual
process. The clock-maker, for example, is not immanent in the clock he
has produced. For the Divine to be immanent, it must be
in some sense, and not just something on which something else depends,
which could be external.
In theology there has long been a tension between the transcendence
and the immanence of God, both of which are asserted by classical theism.
To avoid a deism which has only transcendence, to avoid pantheism which
has only immanence, and thus to see how theism may be a coherent belief,
it is necessary to give some rational account of how God may be
both transcendent of and immanent in the world. One common account
has been to see God as the `Author, Sustainer, and Finisher' of all natural
processes. Thus with thinkers ranging from Aquinas to Descartes, ``the
action of divine conservation is construed to be an `extension' of the
action of divine creation'', or even essentially
the same, but the means of this conservation
is rarely explained further. Process Theologies, on the other hand, stress
the involvement of God in the world, but seem to lose sight of His Transcendence.
Another theological account, equally well established,
sees the Divine immanence as the indwelling of God's omnipresent Spirit.
This view would seem to express certain basic principles, and I will be
taking these up in this paper, but the details of the relationship between
the Spirit and natural beings should be made clearer. The obscurity is
compounded by increasing uncertainties over the nature of any kind of relationship
between mental and physical entities.
Both the philosophical and theological accounts leave uncertain the
question of exactly how, in an effective as well as in an abstract sense,
the Divine is immanent in nature. Thus, for instance, they do not describe
the actual relationship between the immanent Divine and the causal powers
determined by physical investigation, and therefore find it difficult to
formulate possible replies to the physicist's query above.
Divine Dispositional Immanence
For these reasons I wish in this paper to restate an old idea, one that
has been only occasionally taken up, and expand
it using a modern philosophy of dispositions. This idea is a simple scheme
for the relation of Divine and natural powers, and suggests how physical
laws might be not only compatible with Divine Immanence in nature, but
also a consequence of Immanence. The thesis I wish to defend may be called
the hypothesis of `Divine Dispositional Immanence' (DDI for short), and
DDI: The dispositions of an object are those derivatives
of Divine Power that accord with what is actual about that object.
Here, `actuality' is defined as that which is not constituted by
capacities, potentialities and/or dispositions of any kind. Exactly what
about a natural object depends on a detailed physics, and will be different
according to Newtonian and quantum mechanics (see ref. ).
actualities then correspond to which dispositions is a subject for
further investigation, as is whether this is a strict one-to-one correspondence.
To explain what the DDI thesis means, consider two analogies. God provides
life as the sun shines on the earth. The sun shining on the earth is constant,
but the energy received by the earth varies by days and seasons. We know,
however, that this variation is according to the earth's distance and orientation:
according to something actual about the earth, not because of variations
in the sun. A second analogy is that God provides life as we are provided
with food. Consider the way animals consume food in order to live. What
an animal is capable of doing after eating depends on its digestive system
and how it has assimilated the food. Different species will respond quite
differently to the same food, according to how they are constituted. (These
analogies are discussed further in section 2.5.)
If on first sight the hypothesis seems too far-fetched or implausible,
remember that it is designed to reproduce just those kinds of effects we
usually see in the world around us. Remember too that I have not specified
what in fact is `actual', so strictly speaking the thesis has `materialistic',
`dualistic' and `idealistic' versions, depending on whether only matter
is actual, or both matter and mind, or mind only. Thus, the DDI thesis
defines a general framework in which these theories of nature can be discussed
within a theistic context. One consequence of Immanence should be to make
all things (mind and/or matter) behave as if they were active from
themselves, as that is the way they appear to us. We might rightly be wary
of a God with absolute and arbitrary power to act under any pretext whatsoever:
the precise content of the DDI thesis is that, on the contrary, God acts
in a reasonable and orderly fashion compatible with (some kind of) natural
This paper may be regarded as an exercise in the Theology of Nature,
but of a kind that is hypothetico-deductive, not inductive. That is, we
postulate an explanatory hypothesis such as the DDI thesis, and follow
its consequences to see how well they agree with what we know already.
The hypothesis can only be entertained, however, if expressed coherently,
and considered logically possible. To that end, section 2 presents philosophical
analyses of four constituent concepts used in the DDI thesis. Only if these
ideas are not incoherent can the DDI thesis be reasonably considered. The
thesis must also be shown to be consistent with physics, as physics is
an existing attempt to relate the actual forms of natural objects to their
dispositions and potentialities.
Finally, the DDI thesis will be considered within the framework of a
theistic theology that might be considered already well established. Since
the DDI thesis is a statement of what God does, and may be a restriction
on arbitrary omnipotence, the thesis will have to be shown to be theologically
reasonable. We should also see if it is preferable to occasionalism,
whereby God is the direct and only cause of natural events, and to concurrentism,
whereby God is a general cause which must cooperate with pre-existing natural
powers. That is, we must show that the DDI thesis describes what would
be done by God as He is understood in the western tradition, and is not
opposed by other attributes the tradition believes essential to the Divine.
The demonstration will be based on the argument that God, if Life Itself,
cannot create natural beings that both are distinct from Him, and live
from themselves (i.e. that are their own dispositions to act). What
be done is to provide the life of these beings for them to live
from themselves. This is what appears to happen, although in this paper
I will be discussing only natural dispositions, and not looking at the
full range of `life'.
In this section, several concepts and ideas are examined and explained
in an attempt to show their logical possibility, if not also their philosophical
plausibility. These are (1) that natural objects can have real dispositions,
(2) that it is coherent to talk of `dispositions according to what is actual',
(3) that meaning can be given to the term `derivative disposition', and
(4) that we have a true immanence if we adopt the DDI thesis. Finally there
is the question of the validity of the metaphors of `providing', `receiving'
and `retaining' dispositions.
Explanations therefore start with the meaning of the term `disposition',
and the observation that dispositional properties can never be reduced
to entirely static or formal structural properties. Their explanation must
always involve some irreducibly `causal' feature of some kind: some dynamic
(rather than static) property.
Dispositions, and their categorical
I will be using the terms `power', `potential', `capability', `capacity',
`propensity' and `cause' as examples in the category of
properties of objects. The power
of an acid to dissolve a metal, for example, is a dispositional property.
It says what would happen if certain circumstances occurred,
namely that the acid was put in contact with the metal at a suitable temperature.
The electric and gravitational potentials are measures of capacities
to exert forces, should a suitable test particle be present. We normally
believe the the dissolving powers of acid and the potentials of electric
charges are still present even if metals or test particles are not present,
and then seek to explain these dispositional properties in terms of some
feature of the object (acid or electric charge) that gives rise to them.
We must note, however, that this explanation of dispositional properties
only explains or reduces them to other dispositions, and not to
entirely static or structural properties. For suppose that the exact shape
and size of a pencil were known, along with all the shapes and sizes of
all its atomic parts, but no information about the dispositions of these
parts. We would still know nothing about how the pencil would change
with time or on interactions. In fact, if it and its parts had no
dispositional properties, as Hume wants to argue, then we have his conclusion
that any actions or changes (apart perhaps from uniform motion) would be
entirely inexplicable: there would be nothing about the pencil that could
lead to these changes rather than any others. This categorical irreducibility
of dispositions was seen clearly by Aristotle and Leibniz, and has been
explained at some length recently by Leclerc,
Harre & Madden, and Emmet.
According to Shoemaker, the continued
identity of objects also depends on their causal properties. There seems
no way to avoid the conclusion that something
like dispositions are a fundamental part of any physical explanation.
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, I take the reality of dispositional
properties to be philosophically plausible, even though their exact features
are not deducible a priori, and must be the subject of empirical
Dispositions first appear in physics as the macroscopic features of observable
objects that we wish to explain. Dispositional properties are largely those
which cannot be explained purely by the location and shape of these objects,
but require causal kinds of ascriptions and analyses, as explained
above, in terms of causal powers. Thus the elasticity of a solid, for example,
is explained in terms of the attractions between the electrons and their
neighbouring atoms. Note that it is not enough to say that the elasticity
can be explained simply in terms of the `electronic structure', as purely
structural properties cannot explain dispositional features without assuming
some dispositions (such as charge, mass etc.) inherent in the electrons
themselves. This irreducibility of causal explanation in physics has been
discussed in detail elsewhere.
In order to determine the overall consistency of the DDI thesis with
physics, we note that some similar kind of thesis is necessary if
physics is to contain not only a phenomenological description of causes,
but also a mathematical foundation that determines causes according to
actualities. We conclude that the DDI thesis is consistent with
Newtonian physics if `according to what is actual' is taken to mean
`according to the spatial shape and configuration of the atomic particles'.
It can also be consistent with quantum mechanics if `actuality' means `the
quantum numbers of the most elementary particles, and also the definite
past events that determine the current quantum state'.
A distinction is being made between the `Principal Cause' (that disposition
which operates), and the `Instrumental Cause' (that circumstance by means
of which dispositions operate). Principal causes operate according to instrumental
causes. Both are necessary for any action, for example, when a stone is
let fall: the principal cause is the earth's gravitational attraction,
and the instrumental cause is our action of letting go. Its hitting the
ground is thus caused by our letting go, but only as an instrumental cause.
Many common uses of `cause' refer to instrumental causes rather than principal
causes, as it is only in the instrumental sense that events can
be said to be causes. The distinction between principal and instrumental
causes is important, as the DDI thesis can be regarded as the claim that
God is the original principal cause of all events. Principal causes
cannot operate without suitable conditions and actual circumstances (i.e.
without suitable instrumental causes), and the DDI thesis states simply
that the selection of which principal causes can operate must depend
on which instrumental causes are actually present.
Natural dispositions, according to the DDI thesis, are `derivative' from
the Divine, in some sense of `derivation' to be explained. In this section
I first show by examples what is meant by a `derivative disposition', and
then examine how such dispositions differ from `component dispositions'.
I want them to be not part of the Divine, but generated by Divine
action when necessary. Having derivative dispositions means that natural
dispositions may be the principal causes of physical events, and also
that the (original) principal cause of these natural dispositions can be
the Divine Itself. Thus, there can be successive or derivative stages in
the way the Divine Power leads to natural events.
Derivative dispositions arise when the accomplishment of a given disposition
requires the operation of successive steps of kinds different from the
overall step. The original disposition on its operation therefore generates
from itself the `derived dispositions' for the intermediate steps, which
are means to the original end. An original `disposition to learn', for
example, can generate the derived `disposition to read books', which can
generate further `dispositions to search for books'. These dispositions
would then generate dispositions to move one's body, which in turn lead
ultimately to one's limbs having (physical) dispositions to move. These
successively generated dispositions are all derived from the original
disposition to learn, according to the specific situations.
That such derivative dispositions can be formed means the original
disposition was not a simple disposition, but had considerable complexity
in its first appearance. However, the `disposition to search for a book'
is not strictly a component of a `disposition to learn', in the
sense of being always an actual part of that disposition, as it
is only derived in appropriate circumstances. For this reason we talk of
`derived' rather than `component' dispositions, as the `disposition to
learn' is not simply the mere aggregate of all the dispositions that can
be derived from it, just as any disposition or cause is not merely an aggregate
of all its possible effects. Rather, the original disposition is more like
a `higher order' disposition to generate its derived dispositions according
to circumstances. Just as the effects of a disposition are not contained
within it, but are generated from it according to circumstances, so derived
dispositions are not contained within a higher-order disposition, but are
generated from it according to circumstances.
The detailed selection of derived dispositions may be quite complicated
in general, as it depends not only on the initial state prior to any of
the successive steps, but also on each individual kind of the original
disposition. I claim however that (on reflection) we all can be made aware
of some of the successive derivations in our dispositions to act, as we
select and act out sequences of means to ends.
If we adopt the DDI thesis, the general sequence of derivative dispositions
is ultimately a consequence of the complexity of Divine Omnipotence. We
should not be surprised by the possibility of such complexity: belief that
God is One should not mean that He is always a bare and simple unity, or
that He is incapable of responding to complex situations in appropriate
Immanence and Transcendence?
Since the dispositions of an object are essential to its nature, and are
thus `within' the object, on the DDI thesis the Divine is within all objects
without being identical to any of them. God is within objects because He
does not act on them merely externally, as then they would need a distinct
capacity to respond: one that did not come from God. This is contrary to
the DDI thesis, which is that all capacities and dispositions derive
from the Divine, including dispositions to respond to external influences.
On this basis I believe that we have a true Immanence with the DDI thesis,
whereby we have a God who gives beings all their capacities and liabilities:
their capacities to act and react. We could adopt the principle that `one
is at least where one acts', and then the Divine would be at least
present in natural things.
Although the relation between God and nature is very close, with God
being immanent in the very activity of nature, their exact relation is
more like `being adjacent' than `being of one continuous substance'. This
is because, strictly speaking, dispositions and events are quite different
entities, even though they are spatiotemporally continuous in their operation,
and dispositions are within and give rise to all events. If we take nature
as the collection of what is actual in the world, then it is only
by the DDI thesis that this nature is `that which has its source of change
within itself'. Sometimes however
the dispositions themselves are regarded not only as within nature, but
also as essentially natural. Certainly a natural object could not
persist without its dispositions, so they are essential in that sense,
but that fact does not necessarily mean that they are part of Nature as
distinct from the Divine. Given the DDI thesis, a great many dispositions
that are often called natural are in fact derivative from God. We
may reflect that if God is Immanent in the world, then we would expect
Immanence to be for some purpose essential to the operation of nature,
and we should not be surprised if the investigations of physics have unwittingly
described some of the modes of Divine operation in the world.
Having seen how God can be Immanent within nature, we must now check
that this does not impair His Transcendence. This will be further discussed
in section 3.4, but we establish some preliminary points here. First, Immanence
should not be taken to mean that the Divine is only in natural
things, as then God would not also be Transcendent, only that He is at
least in nature.
Secondly, we must also see whether the Divine need change Itself essentially
to keep track of a changing nature (as Process Theologies seem to imply),
given that the Divine Omnipotence is present variously in many different
successive changes in the world. It would appear that since objects can
have changing dispositions, and since they move around in the world, the
Divine would have to continually adjust Itself in response, and we would
not have a true Transcendence. The problem is resolved when we note that
by the DDI thesis, those changing dispositions must result from changing
actualities. Similarly, any moving around in the world must be via a sequence
of different actual positions. If we take the Divine Omnipotence Itself
to be something like an original capacity to derive dispositions according
to what is actual at each time, then this original capacity need not
be changed as the world changes. Although the Divine acts differently
at successive times, the Divine capacities to act need not change
themselves to do so, as all the differences can be attributed to how actualities
are different at each successive time. The original Divine Omnipotence,
although present in and the first principal cause of every natural change,
is thus in an important sense completely Transcendent of the changing nature.
The dispositions derivative from the Divine, however, are subsequent
principal causes, and only partially transcendent of natural objects. They
are transcendent in the senses that (1) they are the direct result of Divine
action, and (2) they are the principal causes (dispositions) rather than
instrumental causes (previous effects) of all actual change in the world,
and are thus the source of those changes. They are not completely
transcendent, however, in that they themselves change as the world changes.
But because they are derivative rather than component dispositions, this
does not mean that the Divine Itself changes.
Analogies for `providing', `receiving'
and `retaining' dispositions
This subsection uses various analogies to illustrate the meaning of some
of the processes described in the DDI thesis. These analogies are designed
to show similar processes occurring in well known situations, and thus
to show that their descriptions are not incoherent. The analogies are NOT
to be taken as their literal meaning in the DDI thesis, even though
they may have a long history of being used to portray that meaning.
The first analogy portrays what could be meant by something having dispositions
`according to its actuality', and is an analogy with the reception of heat
and light of the sun by parts of the earth. In this process, with days
and seasons etc., there is a great variety of reception by all the different
geographical regions, but (since Copernicus) this is not to be attributed
to variability in the sun itself. Rather, the sun is (or may be) constant,
but all the variation is in the earth, its parts themselves, and in their
circumstances with respect to the sun. The earth thus receives heat and
light `according to its (static) actuality'. If furthermore the name `the
sun' can include all the heat and light from it, then there is a sense
in which the sun `provides' the earth with energy by being `immanent' in
the earth's atmosphere.
Another analogy for the `reception' of life according to actual form
is the consumption of food and drink by living organisms. Here, quite clearly,
the organisms receive what is necessary for their life, and they only receive
it according to how their form allows them to digest the different kinds
of foods etc. The same food may be received quite differently by different
organisms, according to their actual forms.
One essential part of the DDI thesis is that natural beings have their
dispositions provided for them, but, notwithstanding this, that they can
act `as if' from themselves in an autonomous manner. Although this makes
little difference to the behaviour of atoms and electrons, it is important
for living creatures. We do not have an occasionalism then, with the Divine
`living through' a person. We do not have, for example, people having no
influence on the time of their actions, and thus no control as agents should
control their behaviour. For a living being to have its dispositions provided
properly, it must be able to `retain' them, so that it can freely use them
when it sees fit. Only in this way can we have any autonomy of created
beings in the face of the seeming dominance of Divine Immanence. The freedom
that creatures can have is the freedom to act as they want, at times that
they choose, with their actions appearing both to themselves and to others
to be as if from their own nature.
The analogy of food consumption is again relevant here. Consumed food
does not act immediately, but is stored against future use. We therefore
do not say that the food is `living through us', but that we have our life
provided (in some sense) by the food. One could argue that when we act
it is really the food operating, and indeed potential energy from the food
is the `principal cause' of our action. However, the energy only acts by
means of `instrumental causes': our decision to act, for example, and suitable
circumstances for that action. The DDI thesis has the Divine as the original
Principal Cause of natural processes, and thus, using our analogy, continually
`feeding' the world with `energy' and powers, in order to keep it going.
The main point to note in this section is that there is a functional
similarity between the processes of `providing', `receiving' and `retaining'
dispositions, and the processes of providing, receiving and retaining material
things. This correspondence is a rich source of metaphors for describing
Divine Immanence, but I hope to have shown in this paper that literal and
non-metaphorical descriptions are also available.
The Theological Case
Since this is primarily a philosophical exposition, yet one concerned with
theological subjects, I will be presenting only a simple outline of a theological
case and the arguments for its support. As the case begins by an identification
of God as Life Itself, a few words about what I mean by `life' are in order.
I take `life' to be essentially dynamic, akin to a set of causal and dynamic
powers, rather than a static entity. This means that `life' is also in
the dispositional category, although it is clearly not a simple example
of this category.
It is important here to remember also the distinction between `component'
and `derived' dispositions as presented in section 2.3. I am not
considering the thesis that the Divine Life is composed or consists of
natural dispositions, only that, since the Divine may have to use such
dispositions in certain circumstances, God should be able to generate
these `derived dispositions' where appropriate.
Summary of an Argument
eTo describe God as Life Itself is to give one of His lesser known perfections,
but it is a perfection because, as noted in (9), with God this Life
may well consist of Love and Wisdom Themselves. Note that we are not
identifying God as the sum of all finite lives, as some kind of `world
soul', or as the `supreme holistic concept',
but as the source of all life (love and wisdom) in the world. There
might not have been a world, but God would not necessarily be different
in that case. That God is Life Itself is consonant with the Christian belief
``All that came to be was alive with his life'' (John 1.2f), as in John
14.6. It is also presupposed by John 5.26 (``For as the Father has life
in himself, so has he given to the Son to have life in himself'').
God is Life Itself. He thus lives from himself (in the sense of not living
as a consequence of anything else).
God cannot make created things have life in themselves, as then they would
not be distinct from Him. For suppose
God did create something that lived from itself. Then
That thing would have as one of its attributes life itself. So
That thing would have as one if its attributes God. Thus
That thing would not be distinct from God.
There are beings (e.g. human beings) distinct from God, yet with the appearance
God can `provide' our life, which is our set of dispositions to
act, think, and will.
All our life is provided by God, and there is no life apart from God. If
we take the principle that `one is at least where one acts', God would
be immanent in His creation. Being eternal Life Itself, He is also
transcendent of His creation.
God does provide our life `in accord with what is actual about ourselves'
(the DDI thesis).
Once our life is provided, we have to choose which dispositions to realise
(using our understanding of consequences, purposes etc). This is a freedom
(given also by God): to act for good or for bad purposes. The result of
exercising that freedom is something actual about us, and makes us (by
the DDI thesis) into what we are.
The distinction between the transcendent God and the finite creation depends
on the distinction between the actual forms of created things and their
received life. Thus we have neither pantheism nor deism, but what is I
hope a thorough-going theism: `God in everything'.
Life with God may be Infinite Love and Wisdom, but with progressively simpler
actualities, simpler and more rudimentary dispositional derivatives of
this Life can be operative. The dispositions of physical objects are thus
simple, as their actual forms are simple.
God is omnipotent in the sense that He is able to do all things from Himself,
and the power of all others is derived from Him. This omnipotence is more
specific than the power do to anything logically possible. Rather, since
he is the source of all rules how powers operate, he always works within
his own rules, according to His own Nature.
The next step is to see that such a God is logically unable to make
distinct beings have life in themselves. For if there were any life itself
in created things, this would be Life Itself
and hence continuous with God, and that which is continuous with God is
God. This is a logical consequence of God being all Life Itself, and thus
cannot be regarded as a limitation of Divine Omnipotence.
Of course, this does not mean that it is a priori inconceivable
to talk of natural things having life itself as one of their properties,
and thus acting from themselves. It is only that if there is a God
who is life itself, then anything distinct from him does not in
fact have such a life. The validity of this inference was seen by Hume:
``By supposing it [the present material world] to contain the principle
of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God''.
God's provision of our life is logically possible, as I have attempted
to show in section 2 that there are no incoherencies which render it impossible,
and thus could be within the range of His omnipotence. The logical consequence
of God being life itself is thus that all our life must be provided by
him, and that there is no life, of any kind, apart from him (cf. Christian
belief in John 15.5 ``Without me you can do nothing'', and John 3.27 ``A
man can receive nothing, except it be given him from heaven''). Note that
this means it is an error to think we live entirely from ourselves, from
our own life, though perhaps an error easy
to make as it certainly appears `as if' that were the case.
The hypothesis of Divine Dispositional Immanence is that God does provide
life, and that the variability of the reception is according to some actual
feature of the recipient. Some such process as this seems to be implied
by the theological doctrine of life according to works (Matthew 16.27:
``He shall reward every man according to his works'', and in many other
places). The `reward' here could be `life from God', and this is an instance
of the DDI thesis, if this `life' is provided `according to what one actually
does'. In fact, it is amusing to note that this is more in agreement with
the quantum mechanical version of the DDI thesis, than with the Newtonian
version. For in quantum theory too, the dispositional state (the wave function)
is given according to past events: the `life' of a quantum object
is `rewarded' according to its `works', not according to its spatial shape.
Note that in this overall theory, the `according to' relation is used in
(at least) two stages: dispositional `life' is first provided according
to spatial form and/or past events, then these dispositions act
to circumstances to produce new actual events. It is these definite
historical events which are the final effects, and are what is terminal
and permanent with respect to Divine Power.
The Problem of Evil
Perhaps the main theological objection to the DDI thesis (indeed to any
theistic account) would be that it seems to involve God in some way in
physical processes, including those that might be random, destructive,
or even evil. This is a problem if we believe that God is wholly benevolent.
As a preliminary step, I use the `free will' defence: even with the
DDI thesis, God is not `acting through' the world, but gives all natural
beings (whatever their kind) freedom and life to act as they wish.
As Christian belief has in Matthew 5.45, ``he makes his sun rise on the
evil and the good, and sends his rain on the just and the unjust''. Of
course, this does not mean that `the just and the unjust' are treated identically
and have the same sets of dispositions and intentions. Rather, as they
will perform different acts and have different actual forms, by the DDI
principle they will have different dispositions, and then lead the different
lives of their choice. Just because He sustains the consequences of many
actions does not mean that He wants them to happen that way,
only that He seems to prefer continued existence of people concerned, rather
than their non-existence.
We may also ask how certain beings have dispositions which tend to act
contrary to the Divine intentions, given that all dispositions derive from
the Divine, and given that there are no evil or contrary intentions in
the Divine Life. We certainly agree that a benevolent God would permit
certain contrary intentions, but wonder how these could ever persist
in a universe governed by the DDI principle.
One may wonder for example how selfish dispositions could be sustained,
when there is no selfishness in God. I believe that the answer lies in
seeing that certain dispositions, to look after oneself for example, have
a good use in certain contexts, and may well be derivable from the Divine
Life at certain stages. They only perform good uses, however, when they
are coordinated and governed by prior derivative dispositions, such
as intentions to be useful to others. This is the way they may be linked
in the Divine Life, but it is possible that some persons may be such that
they can only `receive' the dispositions to look after oneself, and not
the prior dispositions that are supposed to govern them. If these persons
are still to live, then they can only be alive with a restricted fragment
of the Divine Life, a fragment that in this case will act with regard to
one person only. This fragment by itself, and derivatives from it in its
`uncoordinated' state, may well be disposed contrary to the original Divine
intentions. These subsequent contrary derivatives are only indirectly generated
from the Divine Life, via the continued existence of the persons
concerned. The Divine benevolence is maintained, provided we do
not forget that these contrary dispositions are derived via the
(good) disposition to give (some kind of) life to all persons, and that
they are not a permanent component of the original Divine.
Does not God only provide spiritual
Another objection to the DDI thesis might be that we would expect the life
provided by God to be only `spiritual' and/or `rational', and that these
are completely different from the natural dispositions under discussion
here, which have physical consequences. The reply is that God may well
provide these kinds of life too, but, by the DDI thesis nevertheless, this
only means that there would have to be corresponding spiritual or rational
`actualities' for their reception. Whether or not there are such distinct
actual forms - whether humans have `souls' and/or `intellects' - is beyond
the scope of this paper (though see notes [18,22,32]).
In any case, since God is `God of heaven and earth', I can see no
objection to extremely simple derivatives of His power being the physical
dispositions: ``All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth'' (Matthew
Theism and Pantheism
A third objection might be that nature can now no longer be properly distinguished
from God, and thus it is too easy to say `` ... really, nature is
God.'' Against this, we have all the distinctions between Source and receptacle,
between Life and act, between cause and effect, and between principal cause
and instrumental `cause'. As discussed
in section 2.4, there is no identity between the categories of dispositions
and of events, even though dispositions are within and give rise to all
events. Nature itself must be taken to be the collection of finite
actualities in the world, and it is only by the DDI thesis that this nature
is that which has its source of change within itself. As long as we distinguish
these sets of events from their received dispositions `within', then there
is no difficulty. Problems only arise when dispositions themselves are
regarded not only `as if' natural, but also
As remarked above, this is a mistake easily made, for, given the DDI thesis,
a great deal of what is called natural is in fact continually derivative
Kinds of Omnipotence
It may seem that the strict application of the DDI thesis is a restriction
on Divine omnipotence and freedom. Why should God not have the power to
do whatever is conceivable? Why should
He not do what He likes with His creation, giving as much life as He pleases
to any or all beings, irrespective of their actual form, spatial shape,
or past deeds? Apart from the question of whether it is `fair' to treat
different beings in such a erratic manner, to raise this objection is to
ask the long-standing question of what it is (if anything) that humans
in their present condition can do to receive God's `reward'. For if there
is nothing they can do, then any reward or reception must in the end be
arbitrary. I think it might be generally agreed that faith without works
is dead, and this dependence on works could be in accordance with the DDI
thesis as suggested above, with `what is actual' being the historical events
actually performed by a being.
Concurrentism and Occasionalism
There have been long debates concerning
the relation of Divine and natural causations. Aquinas has followed Aristotle
in asserting that physical objects have their own powers, and that God,
in his sustaining of the world, cooperates with these powers. al-Ghazali
and later Malebranche, however, held that all natural powers are really
God acting, so that He is the only cause of natural processes. Previous
natural events are only the occasion for God acting, hence the name
The DDI thesis lies part way between these two views. According to it,
the natural powers of an object do arise on the occasion of its past events.
But then these are the powers of the object, which function in an Aristotelean
fashion as the nature of that object, and which science can investigate.
By having in this manner two (or more) stages between the Divine source
and actual events, a initial occasionalism can give rise to physical objects
having real natures which can act as true causes.
One of the aims of this paper has been to present and explain the concept
of `dispositions according to actuality', and to show that it has explanatory
power both in physics and theology. With the help of this concept a principle
of `Divine Dispositional Immanence' was proposed, and it was shown that
if God were immanent in the world in this way, then He would be present
in all changes without being essentially changed Himself. Furthermore,
He would not be immanent arbitrarily, but according to a well defined order.
Then, because this order is `according to' the forms and/or actions of
natural objects, immanence gives rise to physical laws which typically
relate actual forms and capabilities in a regular manner. The imagined
role of God in the natural processes of the world has tended to diminish
over the last few centuries, as scientists have tried to explain the causal
properties of objects in terms of physical laws, and not by the direct
intervention of external powers. I suggest that this is arguing from appearances:
assuming (erroneously) that because natural objects appear to act from
themselves, then in fact they have (or are) their own principle of activity
and organisation. As shown in section 3, this cannot be the case if there
is a God who is Life Itself.
It should be clear that the manner of Immanence proposed in this paper
is distinct from a deism in which God `provides the laws' of natural operation,
and then either leaves the world to proceed independently, or occasionally
interferes in its operation. It is also more specific than saying that
God is the `metaphysical principle' that is presupposed by all natural
existences and events, as by the present hypothesis God is being given
a `more active role'. This `active role' however is such that it almost
always appears as if persons and natural objects freely acted from
In conclusion, I hope to have shown that no `concession to irrationality'
is needed to understand the possibility of Divine Immanence, and of its
consistency with physical laws.
I would like to thank Dorothy Emmet for a valuable series of comments on
earlier drafts of this paper, and the referees for numerous constructive
criticisms and comments.
Physics Department, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 5XH, U.K., Oct
Notes and Bibliography
This issue is to be distinguished from the `historical questions' of
when, or how the universe originally was formed.
John Maddox, review of The Probability of God by Hugh Montefiore,
in Nature, 315 (23 May 1985), p 353.
Ivor Leclerc in The Nature of Physical Existence, Muirhead Library
of Philosophy, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1972) looks particularly at
the systems of Aristotle, Liebniz, and Whitehead.
J.H. Newman, Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870) published
by University of Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame, London), 1979, p95.
as summarised in Robert A. Oakes, ``A New Argument For the Existence
of God'', New Scholasticism, 54 (1980) pp 213 - 223.
See for example J.K.Kvanvig & H.J. McCann ``Divine Conservation
and the Persistence of the World'', pp. 13 - 49 in T.V. Morris (ed.) Divine
and Human Action, Cornell U.P., 1988.
Hugh Montefiore The Probability of God, SCM Press (London),
1985, ch. 9.
A similar view is outlined in P. van Inwagen ``The Place of Chance
in a World Sustained by God'', pp. 211 - 235 in T.V. Morris (ed.) Divine
and Human Action, Cornell U.P., 1988. The current scheme is one of
a number of emanationist theories that have been presented. The clearest
presentation, I believe, is by the Swedish philosopher and theologian Emmanuel
Swedenborg in the 18th century.
Ian Thompson ``Real
Dispositions in the Physical World'', British Jnl. for the Phil. Science
(1988) pp 67 - 79.
For a general introduction, see R. Harre and E.H. Madden, Causal
Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity, Blackwell (Oxford), 1975, p86.
See also R. Harre ``Powers'', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
(1970) pp 81 - 101.
The ascription of properties in this category is typically, adapting
a definition of Harre and Madden, of the
form ``Object S has the dispositional power P to do action A'' if and
``if S is in some circumstance C, then there will be a non-zero likelihood
of S doing A, in virtue of the constitution of S. In general, C will depend
on P and the kind of the action A''. Here, the `circumstance C' is usually
defined by multiple spatial relations to other objects, and the `action
A' can either be a change in S itself or an interaction with other objects.
The phrase `in virtue of the constitution of S' is designed
to exclude `changes' to certain properties of S that are changes in purely
external relations that may come about completely independently of whatever
S is actually like. The double `if' in the definition is important: if
reflects the essential subjunctive nature of dispositions.
Note that we are not with these ascriptions assuming a permanent `nature'
of the object from which all its powers can be always deduced, only that
at any given time there is `something about the object', a `real internal
constitution' (to use Locke's phrase), that explains all the dispositions
it in fact has at that time.
Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose, Prentice-Hall (New Jersey),
D.H. Mellor ``In Defence of Dispositions'', Philosophical Review,
(1974), no. 2, p157-181.
Dorothy Emmet The Effectiveness of Causes, Macmillan (London),
1984, ch.8, and references therein.
Sidney Shoemaker ``Identity, Properties and Causality'' in Midwest
Studies in Philosophy Vol. IV (University of Minnesota, 1979) pp 321
This holds however much we may dislike notions resembling `occult powers'.
We could only do one or more of the following (a) deny the subjunctive
in the power ascription as anything more than hypothetical, (b) treat science
as finding only the regularity of effects and not as discovering causes
and determining constitutions, or (c) consider the world as a `Zeno universe'
that has only successive states and no proper changes. My objections to
these `escape moves' are summarised separately.
Nancy Cartwright How the Laws of Physics Lie Clarendon Press
(Oxford), 1983. One of her objections to `laws of physics' is that they
do not say what does happen, only what might happen in suitable
circumstances (e.g. no interference from outside influences). This behaviour
is more understandable, however, when laws are regarded as laws of causes,
not simply as laws of effects.
It may well be that, since not all these derived dispositions are strictly
we have that beginning of an account of how minds play an intermediate
role between the Divine Source and the operation of selected parts of the
It is not clear, however, that this principle applies directly in this
case. It is also conceivable that the Divine can act in space without necessary
being spatial, just as, for example, the wave function in quantum mechanics
seems to behave. The Divine, to consider one option, may well order events
by their functions, purposes or uses, and then `be present'
with them according to this order, which would not be essentially
a spatial order.
Leclerc, see n. , p 106. See also
Aristotle's ``Metaphyics'' 1015a 13-15.
If we were to group all derivative dispositions together, then then
they may perhaps be called a `Consequent' or `Proceeding' Divine, and this
would be variable in time as envisaged in Process
Theologies. The derivative dispositions in this Proceeding Divine are present
continually with all natural objects, as they constitute all natural dispositions
to act and react.
A full treatment of this freedom may however depend on elucidating
the operation of psychological dispositions within some non-materialist
It may be objected that these analogies use ``thing'' talk of dispositions
and life, as if they were something which could be provided, received
and retained, just as we can provide, receive and retain material things.
If dispositions were in fact `things' which could be `handed over', then
the DDI thesis would not give the true Immanence of God in nature
that was discussed in the previous section. The best reply to this objection
is to analyse what we mean by a `material thing', as in ref. ,
and to see that `things' themselves are best identified as structures of
`real dispositions' in the physical world. Rather than reducing talk of
dispositions to talk of physical objects, the reverse is more accurate:
we can analyse the nature of material objects in terms of dispositions
that happen to be spatio-temporal distributions of propensities. Then,
if dispositions do not have a determinate time of acting, they may be called
`retained dispositions' in analogy to `retained things' because they would
be effective over a finite time duration, and thus appear as enduring and
Although not essential to the DDI thesis, some theologians such as
Swedenborg hold that God's Life is not just Divine Omnipotence, but is
something like Love and Wisdom Themselves, from which Omnipotence can be
(in the sense of section 2.3). Thus, analogously to the way the DDI thesis
has particular dispositions derived from Divine Omnipotence according to
actual circumstances, it could be that Omnipotence is derived from the
essential Love and Wisdom according to the `spiritual circumstances'. This
possibility enables the meaning of `derived disposition' to be extended,
and allows natural dispositions (and `natural life', as sets of dispositions)
to be as a whole derivable from the Divine Life Itself. The terms `life'
and `life itself' are used here as nouns, but again they should be regarded
as dispositional words referring to intrinsic capacities to love, understand
and act etc.
Paul Davies God and the New Physics, Dent (London), 1983, p223.
The capital letters are not essential - they are only used to remind
David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part IV. His
Philo, however, uses this validity to draw the opposite conclusion, as
he continues ``and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the
Perhaps it is this error which is schematically portrayed in Genesis
3.5ff, as a forseeable but avoidable mistake. To make this mistake is to
argue from appearances, and to appropriate life and wisdom to oneself,
to become `as God'.
I am not discussing here the problem of how evils arise in the
first place: see note .
It may seem that we have the paradox of `double agency' discussed by
Jeffrey C. Eaton in ``The Problem of Miracles and the Paradox of Double
Agency'' Modern Theology, 1 (1985) pp 211-222. Eaton suggests the
solution is to see that ``God acts upon the world in such a way as to cause
the world to make itself''. The DDI solution is more specific, explaining
how God's (principal) agency acts according to our own (instrumental)
`agency', giving rise to the appearance of a paradoxical `double agency'
only if principal and instrumental causations are conflated.
In section 3.1, item 10 gives what I believe is a more satisfactory
view of (non-arbitrary) Divine Omnipotence. Further discussion, however,
will have to be continued elsewhere.
It may prove necessary here to distinguish between acts as agents and
as patients, where acts of agency are those performed from the agents own
loves. This distinction, however, requires something `spiritual' and/or
`rational' to render such loves actual and permanent as distinct from the
physical events themselves, as discussed above.
See A.J. Freddoso ``Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary
Causation in Nature'', pp. 74 - 118 in T.V. Morris (ed.) Divine and
Human Action, Cornell U.P., 1988. For more discussion see notes 4 &
12 in van Inwagen (ref. ).